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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The predecessor paper to this publication, “Volcker/Vickers Hybrid”: The Liikanen Report 
and Justifications For Ring Fencing and Separate Legal Entities, considered the merits, 
objectives and cost-benefit attributes of respective models associated with the Vickers 
Report, Liikanen Report and Volckers Rule – by way of reference to the degree of separation 
of legal entities or banking activities involved, as well as whether an outright ban or 
prohibition on proprietary trading is involved. 
 
This paper is aimed at highlighting why ring fencing not only presents a more feasible and 
cost effective option to other models, but also why its degree of flexibility provides the more 
appropriate balance in a financial environment whose trend is increasingly inclined towards 
conglomeration. 
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Ring Fencing Volcker’s Rule? : The Liikanen Report and Justifications for 
Ring Fencing and Separate Legal Entities Revisited 
 
 
 
A  Introduction 
 
In assessing the need for re-structuring banks into separate legal activities, two considerations 
which have been given due attention are:
1
 
 
- The important role of recovery and resolution plans – whereby the decision on possible 
separation of bank entities was to be conditionally based on the assessment of such plans; 
 
- The mandatory separation of banks' proprietary trading and other risky activities. 
 
The first of these considerations is justifiable on the basis of the lessons learned from 
Northern Rock. Northern Rock highlighted the important role of recovery and resolution 
plans and illustrates a situation where the Bank of England was unable to act as effectively to 
perform its traditional role as lender of last resort without such a role being made public. The 
Northern Rock crisis also highlighted problems which were inherent in the tripartite 
arrangement between the Treasury, the Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England 
for dealing with financial stability - which includes amongst others, the inability of the Bank 
to act as lender of last resort for a limited time without such a role being made public. 
 
The rationale for the second consideration, that is, the mandatory separation of banks’ 
proprietary trading and other risky activities, however, appears less convincing given the 
challenges attributed to shadow banking activities, as well as the corresponding difficulties in 
achieving what could effectively be regarded as a separation of banks’ proprietary trading 
and other risky activities. 
 
As indicated in the predecessor paper to this paper, arguments which increasingly favour a 
more flexible model and which are directed in favour of ring fencing, arise from the inherent 
difficulties in the definitions attributed to financial and non-bank financial companies – as  
well as certain ambiguities presented through these definitions.  Furthermore, the extent to 
which „completely“ separate legal entities and activities can be achieved, as well as cost 
implications involved, provide greater justifications for the adoption of a more flexible model  
directed at ring fencing. 
 
B. Justifications for Ring Fencing 
Why should jurisdictions which have invested so much in restructuring their regulatory 
systems to cope with particular risks (for instance, cross sector services risks associated with 
                                                          
1
  See page i of the Liikanen Report (Final Report, 2nd October 2012) 
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conglomeration), be compelled into imposing further laws aimed at facilitating the 
restructuring of the legal entities of their banks? If further restructuring were to occur, should 
the rules governing such restructuring be so draconian such that they allow for little scope 
and flexibility – a situation which appears to be similar to that presented under the Volcker 
Rule model? Whilst the Volcker Rule model certainly has its merits, it has been argued by 
many that a number of ring fencing objectives might not be achieved if the mere prohibition 
of just certain activities  under the Volcker rule were only taken into consideration. 
 
According to Vickers Report (pages 35, 36), the purpose of ring fencing is “to isolate those 
banking activities where continuous provision of service is vital to the economy and to a 
bank’s customers in order to ensure, first, that this provision is not threatened as a result of 
activities which are incidental to it, and second, that such provision can be maintained in the 
event of the bank’s failure without government solvency support.” 
 
Arguments in favour of the adoption of the Ring Fencing Model, as highlighted in the 
predecessor paper are as follows:
2
 
– Ring fencing should generate „significantly lower economic costs” than full separation; 
 
– Ring fencing would secure principal benefits such as guarding against certain contagion 
risks; 
 
– The fact that challenges encountered by ring fencing are manageable and not materially 
greater than those of full separation; 
 
– Legal impediments which exist with full separation; 
 
– It is not certain whether total separation would necessarily facilitate greater financial 
stability 
– That total separation is harder to enforce under European Union Law inasmuch as universal 
banks in other member states remain entitled to own UK retail banking operations. 
 
– The „workability“ and „practicability“ of ring fencing and the fact that ring fenced banks 
would be easier to monitor, supervise and manage than universal banks „other things being 
equal.“ 
 
– The argument that it can be „robustly“ implemented within the current EU framework and 
the difficulty in securing changes to relevant EU Law; 
 
– Legal obstacles which persist with „full separation“ particularly since European Law places 
constraints on the degree to which ownership of companies can be controlled; 
 
                                                          
2  The Independent Commission on Banking (ICB), Final Report, Recommendations, September 2011 at pages 
12, 26, 59 and 65. 
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– That ring fenced banks should be able to engage in effective risk management.“  
 
The Liikanen Review considered a “hybrid” model which embraces features of models 
presented by Volcker’s Rule and the Vicker’s Report. In so doing, it does not impose such 
stringent requirements as those applicable under Volcker’s Rule whilst not being as flexible 
as the ring fencing recommendations in the Vicker’s Report. 
Preference for a combination of measures which consists of imposing a non-risk weighted 
capital buffer for trading activities and the operation of the separation of activities conditional 
on supervisory approval of a recovery and resolution plan, rather than a mandatory separation 
of banking activities, under the Liikanen Report, also appears to offer a more flexible route - 
even though this is still not as flexible as the model under the Vicker’s Report. Such a 
flexible preference appears more feasible than a mandatory separation of banking activities 
given: 
- The costs associated with mandatory separation of banking activities 
- The difficulties of achieving what is reasonably considered to be an effective and acceptable 
degree of separation of banking – owing to the rise of the conglomeration over the years. 
 
In view of the above mentioned attributes of ring fencing and given the need to consider the 
increased trend towards conglomeration, ring fencing would appear to be the most economic, 
appropriate and more time-relevant model to adopt. 
 
Whilst commending Volcker’s Rule, some flaws identified by Sheel and Ganguly as being 
associated with the Rule are as follows:
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i) The fact that Volcker’s Rule “merely prohibits an entity that accepts public deposits from 
undertaking certain types of trades – and that even as it prohibits, proprietary trading, it 
allows hedging and market making. 
 
ii) The inability of efforts aimed at separating banking (from trading activities) to guarantee 
that commercial banking is more immune from risky lending practices. 
 
In addressing Sheel and Ganguly’s question as regards whether Glass-Steagall would have 
prevented the global financial melt-down of 2008, it needs to be remembered that the 
financial environment has evolved over the years. More complex forms of risks have evolved 
over the years and the firewall which existed with Glass-Steagall could not reasonably be 
expected to cope with the less advanced and less complex risks which existed some decades 
ago. Credit risk is certainly a major risk to be addressed – however so are counter party risks. 
                                                          
3 A Sheel and M Ganguly “Ring Fencing Wall Street” http://www.indianexpress.com/news/ringfencing-wall-
street/1210651/0 
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Furthermore, other numerous types of risks have manifested themselves in recent years. 
Other risks emanating from complex OTC derivatives trading and shadow banking further 
complicate the problem. 
 
Ultimately, the distinction between commercial banking, insurance and securities sectors has 
become more blurred as a result of the rise of conglomerates. Hence the Glass-Steagall Act 
would not have effectively addressed these developments – as well as the more complex 
forms of risks which have resulted from OTC derivatives trading and other cross services 
sector risks – for which the adoption of integrated regulation (single financial services 
regulation) in many Scandinavian countries, Germany and the UK has been commended. 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Conclusion 
 
Whilst the Liikanen Report highlights why there is need for re-structuring of banks into 
separate legal entities – as a means of achieving ring fencing activities, the mandatory 
separation of banks’ proprietary trading and other risky activities, such as that opted for under 
the Liikanen Report could be distinguished from the position under Volcker’s Rule in the 
sense that it does not impose such stringent requirements as those  applicable under Volcker’s 
Rule – whilst not being as flexible as ring fencing recommendations proposed in the Vickers 
Report. 
 
However the level of flexibility – such as that offered in the Vickers Report 
recommendations, or the second option under the Liikanen Report consisting of a preference 
for a combination of measures – leaving the separation of activities conditional on 
supervisory approval of a recovery and resolution plan, is to a large extent, necessary given 
the cost-benefit considerations involved in facilitating a mandatory separation. 
 
Having regard to the need to manage cross sector services’ risks, the extent to which 
conglomeration has assumed control over the structure of many bank entities and enterprises, 
justifications for consolidated regulation of financial services’ sectors, as well as the 
questioning of the logic to reverse efforts aimed at effectively managing evolving risks within 
the financial environment, ring fencing appears to be the most favourable, more feasible and 
cost-effective option. 
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